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Some economic observers have proposed that the Federal Reserv e
should not only continue to set policy aimed at keeping inflation at its
c u rrent low level, but should seek to reduce it furt h e r. They argue that
low inflation allows re s o u rces to be allocated more eff i c i e n t l y, thus
yielding substantial economic gains. But Research Associate Wi l l e m
Thorbecke asserts that such a proposal does not take into account how
the costs and benefits of disinflationary monetary policy are distributed;
the burden of the policy falls on low-income families and its benefits
a c c rue to high-income families.
Thorbecke has found that theoretical predictions, econometric re s u l t s ,
and the example of the Volcker disinflation of 1979 to 1982 present a
consistent picture of the distributional effects of contractionary mone-
t a ry policy. Unemployment increases, especially among lower- w a g e
workers, with urban workers, workers not covered by union contracts,
and minorities faring worst. For example, during the disinflationary
p e r i od from 1979 to 1982 African American unemployment incre a s e d
9.5 percent, Hispanic unemployment increased 7.1 percent, while white
unemployment increased 4.5 percent. Research on the effect of disinfla-
tionary policies on various industries and businesses indicates that small
f i rms suffer more than large firms and that durable manufacturing and
c o n s t ruction industries suffer more than other industries when intere s t
rates rise. As interest rates rise during a contraction, however, returns on
bonds increase. Therefore, since most bond market investors are among
the wealthiest 10 percent of Americans, it is those households with
high-income that tend to benefit from contractionary policies, while
lower-income and minority households tend to pay the costs. This redis-
tribution from poorer to wealthier households contributes to the growing
wealth inequality in the United States.  
Thorbecke argues that, because of these distributional consequences,
engineering a disinflationary recession now would be inappropriate. The
central argument against expansionary monetary policy is that it leads to
PPB No.38  2/18/99  2:10 PM  Page 3a rise in inflation, but the recent decline in the unemployment rate has
not resulted in higher inflation; workers today seem willing to forg o
higher wage increases in exchange for job security. The combination of
the facts that lower-income families, interest-sensitive industries, and
small firms are burdened dispro p o rtionately and at the same time the
risks of inflation are low indicates that rather than causing the economy
to contract, the Fed should let it expand. Allowing employment to grow
would benefit those most at risk for shrinking income.
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continued to grow in the United States. As Research Associate Willem
Thorbecke notes, in the past 20 years the income of those on the upper
end of the income distribution has increased steadily, while the income
of those in the poorest decile has decreased almost 30 percent. Some
re s e a rchers and policymakers view this growing disparity as a social
injustice and a threat to social stability, and they have proposed several
ways to close the gap between rich and poor, such as training and educa-
tion for workers so that they can move into higher-skilled, higher-paid
jobs and economic policies that promote the creation of stable, well-
paid jobs. 
In the search for ways to close the income gap, however, many observ e r s
fail to consider that a solution might be found in monetary policy.
Although monetary policy is a potent policy tool that affects a variety of
economic variables, policymakers generally focus on only two—inflation
and unemployment. But, monetary policy has an effect on economic
g rowth generally; its influence is felt throughout the economy. One of the
variables it can have re p e rcussions on is the degree of poverty and wealth
experienced by diff e rent portions of the economy at any point in time. In
this brief Thorbecke argues that the distribution of income and wealth is
widened by contractionary monetary policies and that abandoning these
policies would result in a narrowing of the income gap. Clearly, then,
m o n e t a ry policy should be viewed not just as a means of wringing another
fraction of a percentage point of inflation out of the economy; it can be
used as a tool to overcome widening economic inequities.
Federal Reserve policymakers have appeared reluctant to promote direct
policies that might further reduce the unemployment rate for fear that a
7 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
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tight labor market will lead to upward wage pressures and thus a rise in
inflation. However, a number of economists now question this view of
the relationship between unemployment and inflation, challenging the
long-held belief that low rates of inflation and unemployment cannot
exist simultaneously.  In recent months even the Fed has seemed willing
to test the waters for the sensitivity of inflation to declining unemploy-
ment. If it continues its current policy of non-contraction, the Fed will
be able to gauge the extent of such sensitivity and at the same time can
assist in closing the income gap.
T h o r b e c k e ’s re s e a rch on the effects on workers and firms of higher
i n t e rest rates—the Fed’s common method for controlling inflation—
bolsters the view that because lower-income households are most hurt by
higher interest rates, disinflationary monetary policy not only
contributes to the growing income gap, but also may counter other
government policies that seek to close the income gap. We hope that his
research opens the door to further discussion about the many economic
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Inflation over the last five years has remained below 3 percent. Many
economic observers argue that, as a result, inflation has ceased to matter
much in the decisions of consumers and businesses. Some, such as Mart i n
Feldstein (1997), W. Lee Hoskins (1991), and Jerry Jordan (1993), arg u e
that further gains are needed on the inflationary front. Feldstein, for
instance, asserts that reducing the inflation rate to zero would prod u c e
substantial gains to the economy. He estimates that, to achieve price
s t a b i l i t y, the Federal Reserve would have to engineer a recession that
reduces real gross domestic product by 5 percent, but holds that these costs
would be far outweighed by the benefits that would accrue from reducing the
misallocation of re s o u rces (in jargon, the deadweight losses) due to inflation.
What Feldstein overlooks in his analysis is how the costs and benefits of
such a policy would be distributed. Who would bear the burden of disinfla-
t i o n a ry monetary policy? Who would reap the benefits? Would such distri-
butional consequences be desirable in the present economic environment? 
This brief attempts to answer these questions. It first reviews what economic
t h e o ry predicts will be the effect of disinflationary policy on diff e rent sectors.
The traditional textbook story (called the “money” channel of monetary
policy) implies that when the Fed raises interest rates, employment in
i n t e rest-sensitive industries should fall more than in other industries. Recent
re s e a rch emphasizing the interaction between monetary policy and financial
markets (called the “credit” channel of monetary policy) implies that small,
financially constrained firms should be hurt more than large, financially
stable firms. A slowdown in aggregate activity working through either the
money or the credit channel would burden low-income workers more than
high-income workers. Since minorities tend to have lower wages than
whites, disinflationary policy should dispro p o rtionately affect them. Lenders
such as bondholders would gain by an unanticipated decrease in inflation. 
D i s i n f l a t i o n a ry Monetary Policy 
and the Distribution of Income
PPB No.38  2/18/99  2:10 PM  Page 9Who Pays for Disinflation?
Public Policy Brief 10
The brief next examines evidence concerning the distributional effects of
c o n t r a c t i o n a ry policy. Econometric results are consistent with the theore t-
ical predictions. They indicate that interest-sensitive industries, such as
c o n s t ruction and durable goods, and small firms are harmed dispro p o rt i o n-
a t e l y. Tracing the effects of a slowdown in construction and durable good s
t h rough the economy indicates that the burden falls especially on low-
income urban workers, with unemployment among blacks and Hispanics
i n c reasing approximately twice as much as unemployment among whites.
Evidence also indicates that Tre a s u ry bond prices are driven primarily by
news of inflation and will appreciate as inflation declines. 
Corroboration of these econometric results is obtained by examining the
period from 1979 to 1982, during which the Fed raised interest rates and
caused a contraction of economic activity while reducing inflation.
Employment in durable manufacturing and construction dropped, profits
of small firms declined much more than profits of large firms, and unem-
ployment among blacks rose while unemployment among whites
increased less than half as much. Meanwhile, bond prices soared, bene-
fiting the wealthiest 10 percent of households, who held almost 95
percent of all bonds and trusts (Moore 1989; Niggle 1989). 
Finally the brief considers the policy implications of these findings—
whether now would be a good time to engineer a monetary disinflation,
which would have the ultimate effect of redistributing income from poore r
to wealthier individuals. Over the past 20 years incomes of those on the
upper tail of the income distribution have increased steadily, while
incomes of the poorest decile have decreased almost 30 percent and of the
second poorest decile almost 20 percent (Bradbury 1996). Commenting
on this trend, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Gre e n s p a n ,
stated that it could be a major threat to our society, and the president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, William McDonough, warned that
it could endanger our ability to go forw a rd together as a unified society.
1
Faced with these distributional problems, it seems that now would be a
p a rticularly bad time to engineer a monetary disinflation. Rather, the fact
that inflation has remained quiescent while unemployment has stayed
below 6 percent since September 1994 suggests that now would be a good
time for the Fed to try letting unemployment fall. Even if the monetary
authorities do not stimulate the economy, abstaining from tightening
following positive employment news would be helpful. Allowing the
jobless rate to fall in this way would especially benefit those most at risk in
our society—poorer families, minorities, and inner-city workers. 
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I n t e rest-Sensitive Industries and Small Firm s
In traditional textbook models disinflationary monetary policy slows the
economy by raising interest rates. The Fed directly controls the federal
funds interest rate, the rate on one-day loans between banks. By
i n c reasing current and expected future values of the funds rate,
according to the models, the Fed can raise longer-term interest rates and
reduce stock prices. These changes increase the interest cost of using
capital; as the cost of capital rises, spending on capital goods, houses, and
durables decreases; the reduction in spending then causes output in 
these sectors to fall. As output and thus the incomes of those working in
these industries decline, other sectors of the economy are harmed. The
largest burden, though, is borne by interest-sensitive industries, such as
construction and durable goods.
This direct effect of contractionary monetary policy on interest-sensitive
industries can be amplified by its effect on firms’ access to credit. As
B e rnanke (1993) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) discuss, firms with
strong balance sheet positions can finance their activities either directly
using their own funds or indirectly using their net worth as collateral to
obtain credit. Firms that have weak balance sheets or that are otherwise
constrained in their access to capital markets are more dependent on
banks to finance inventory investment and capital formation. For these
c redit-constrained firms, a monetary contraction can severely curt a i l
their ability to operate. A monetary tightening, by increasing intere s t
rates, can worsen cash flow net of interest and thus firms’ balance sheet
positions (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994). As Bernanke and Blinder (1988)
show, a monetary contraction engineered through an open market sale
by the Federal Reserve can decrease bank loans (assuming that bonds
and bank loans are imperfect substitutes). The reduction in collateraliz-
able net worth and in bank loans caused by a monetary contraction
restricts working capital and thus economic activity among firms with
limited access to capital markets.
G e rtler and Gilchrist argue that smaller firms are more likely to be
constrained in their access to credit. They are more likely to obtain
funds from banks than from equity, bonds, or commercial paper and are
less likely to be well collateralized. Furt h e r, the effect of changes in
D i s i n f l a t i o n a ry Monetary Policy and the Distribution of Income
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m o n e t a ry policy on small firms is greater in bad times than in good
times, that is, a monetary contraction when the economy is in a re c e s-
sion can have a much greater effect on small firms than would a mone-
t a ry expansion when the economy is growing. Thus, if credit constraints
help propagate monetary policy, small firms should be dispro p o rt i o n-
ately burdened by disinflationary monetary policy, especially during
re c e s s i o n s .
Low-Income Wo r k e r s
T h e re are many reasons why contractionary policy should hurt low-
income individuals more than high-income individuals. Blanchard and
Katz (1997) argue that a negative macroeconomic shock such as a tight-
ening of monetary policy will harm those on lower rungs of the occupa-
tional ladder much more than those on higher rungs because the
elasticity of labor supply is greater for unskilled workers than for skilled
workers. The wages of unskilled workers tend to be low, and small
d e c reases can reduce wages below the level at which these workers are
willing to work (in jargon, below their re s e rvation wages). The wages of
skilled workers tend to be higher, and small decreases can leave wages
high enough that the workers will still prefer to work. Thus a business
cycle downturn that reduces wages can sharply reduce employment
among unskilled workers, but have little effect on employment among
skilled workers. Fischer, Dornbusch, and Schmalensee (1988) find that
blue-collar jobs tend to be affected much more than white-collar jobs by
economywide slowdowns. 
Blinder and Esaki (1978) assert that negative macroeconomic shocks
that increase the unemployment rate by one percentage point take about
0.28 percent of national income away from the lowest 40 percent of the
income distribution and give it to the richest 20 percent. An explana-
tion for Blinder and Esaki’s finding is that poorer families receive more of
their income from cyclically sensitive sources, such as low-paying jobs,
whereas high-income families receive more of their income from stable
s o u rces, such as interest payments. Thus low-income, low-skilled indi-
viduals suffer more from a monetary contraction.
It is readily apparent that African Americans tend to have lower
incomes than whites (see, for example, Bound and Freeman 1992). The
reasons for this wage gap are less clear. As Card and Lemieux (1994)
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discuss, the gap could reflect factors such as discrimination, productivity
d i ff e rences, and diff e rential access to job information. The implication
of the wage gap for monetary policy, however, is clear. The brunt of
c o n t r a c t i o n a ry monetary policy falls on blacks and other minorities
earning lower wages rather than on whites.
B o n d h o l d e r s
Another way to shed light on the distributional effects of disinflationary
m o n e t a ry policy is to examine benefits to bond market investors and
other creditors. In order to hold a bond, lenders re q u i re not only an
expected real re t u rn but also compensation for expected inflation.
Assume, for instance, that to hold a given bond, wealth holders require a
2 percent expected real return and a 3 percent inflation premium. The
anticipated nominal re t u rn on the bond would thus be 5 percent. If
inflation declined unexpectedly to 1 percent and the nominal re t u rn
remained at 5 percent, the real return on the bond would actually be 4
p e rcent and lenders would receive a 2 percentage point higher re a l
return than they required—an increase in return provided involuntarily
by borrowers. Thus, a decline in inflation would produce a redistribution
to creditors from debtors. Since it is wealthier households that are credi-
tors and businesses, government, and poorer households that are debtors,
an unanticipated disinflation can be expected to help wealthier house-
holds at the expense of other sectors.
Evidence on the Distributional Effects of Monetary Policy
Economic theory predicts that disinflationary monetary policy will have
d i ff e rential effects across the economy; it will dispro p o rtionately harm
i n t e rest-sensitive industries, small firms, low-income individuals, and
minorities and it will benefit bondholders. This section pre s e n t s
evidence on these distributional effects. 
Econometric Evidence
To calculate the effect of monetary policy on employment by industry
and race and on small firms, the impulse-response methodology of Sims
(1980) is useful. This technique involves measuring unexpected changes
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in monetary policy (the impulse) in month t and predicting the effect on
employment and other variables in months t, t + 1, t + 2, etc. (the
responses). Unexpected changes in monetary policy can be measure d
using unexpected changes in the federal funds rate, a method similar to
that employed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994). The funds rate has often been used as
the Fed’s instrument in implementing monetary policy. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans note that including an index of sensitive
c o m m odity prices along with variables such as GDP and the GDP
deflator in a prediction equation for the funds rate produces a credible
measure of monetary policy in that it is correlated in the expected way
with variables such as bank reserves, real GDP, employment, and prices.
Unexpected changes in the federal funds rate are calculated by regressing
the funds rate on a constant, six lags of itself, six lags of aggregate indus-
trial production growth, the inflation rate, the log of a commodity price
index, the log of nonborrowed reserves, the log of total reserves, and the
log of employment. The portion of the funds rate that cannot be
predicted using these variables (the residual) is treated as the unexpected
change in the funds rate. The predicted responses of employment and
other variables to these funds rate shocks are then noted.
2
Table 1 presents the employment responses by industry to a shock in the
funds rate after 18 months. For all the industries examined the re s p o n s e
peaked after 18 months. The two sectors that are most harmed are
c o n s t ruction and durable goods. As discussed above, these are sectors that
one would expect to be affected by monetary policy because they are
i n t e rest sensitive. For construction, an unexpected increase in the federal
funds rate of one standard deviation (equal to 0.55 percentage points)
d e c reases employment after 18 months on average by 0.7 percent; for
durable manufacturing, the shock decreases employment on average by
0.5 percent. (The following section will help put these response magni-
tudes in perspective by examining the changes in employment in these
industries during the period of monetary contraction from 1979 to 1982.)
Table 1 further indicates that employment in sectors such as nondurable
g o ods, government, transportation, and mining is barely affected. Thus,
c o n t r a c t i o n a ry monetary policy dispro p o rtionately affects employment in
sectors such as construction and durable good s .
To shed further light on the types of workers affected by declines in these
industries, a social accounting matrix (SAM) is useful. This brief uses the
PPB No.38  2/18/99  2:10 PM  Page 14Table 1 Impulse-Response of Sectoral Employment after 18 Months to One
Standard Deviation Shock to the Federal Funds Rate
Response to One Standard 
Sector Deviation Shock to FF (Standard Error)
Construction –0.00693** (0.00235)
Durable goods –0.00491** (0.00169)
Retail trade –0.00261** (0.00076)
Wholesale trade –0.00241** (0.00080)
Finance, insurance, 
real estate –0.00182** (0.00070)
Services –0.00151** (0.00057)




*Significant at the 10 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
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SAM constructed by Roland-Holst and Sancho (1992). Table 2 pre s e n t s
evidence concerning how a $1 decline in output in the construction and
durable goods sectors affects the income of diff e rent groups of workers.
3
Non-union workers who are not covered by union contracts are harm e d
much more than union workers or other covered workers. Since workers
in jobs not covered by union contracts are much more likely to be in
low-income jobs, these results indicate that monetary policy dispro p o r-
tionately harms those on the lower tail of the income distribution. The
table also indicates that urban workers are harmed more than ru r a l
workers; it appears that contractionary monetary policy can worsen the
urban blight afflicting so many cities at pre s e n t .
G e rtler and Gilchrist (1994) use the impulse-response technique to
investigate the differential effect of monetary policy on small and large
firms. They classify firms as small if their total sales are below the 30th
p e rcentile for manufacturing firms. In their examination of several
episodes of tightened monetary policy, they find that it reduces sales of
small firms much more than sales of large firms and that small firm s
exhibit an asymmetric response to monetary policy but large firms do
not. Small firms are harmed much more by contractionary monetary
policy during recessions than they are helped by expansionary monetary
PPB No.38  2/18/99  2:10 PM  Page 15Table 2 E ffect of a $1 Decline in Sectoral Output on the Income of
Various Socioeconomic Groups
Sector
Socioeconomic Group Construction Durable Goods
Union –0.164 –0.130
Non-union, covered by 
union contracts –0.017 –0.015
Non-union, not covered by 
union contracts –0.612 –0.539
Rural –0.030 –0.025
Urban –0.807 –0.692
S o u rc e : David Roland-Holst and Ferran Sancho, “Relative Income Determination in the
United States: A Social Accounting Perspective,” Review of Income and Wealth 3 8
( 1 9 9 2 ) .
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policy during expansions. Gertler and Gilchrist’s evidence thus confirms
the expectation that small firms will bear a greater burden than larg e
firms from contractionary monetary policy.
The impulse-response technique can also be used to investigate the
e ffects of a monetary contraction on unemployment by race. Figure 1
shows the effect over time (48 months) of an increase in the federal
funds rate of one standard deviation (equal to 0.55 percentage points) on
unemployment disaggregated by race. After the contraction unemploy-
ment increases among all races, with the maximal effect for each racial
category occurring between one and two years. The unemployment rate
among whites rises on average by about 0.075 percentage points and the
unemployment rate among Hispanics and blacks by about twice as
much. (The following section will help put these magnitudes in perspec-
tive by examining the changes in unemployment by race during the
period of monetary contraction from 1979 to 1982.)
The evidence above indicates that contractionary monetary policy
reduces employment, with the burden falling dispro p o rtionately on
minorities, low-income individuals, and those working for intere s t -
sensitive industries and small firms. To investigate how such a decrease
in employment affects the bond market, Coppock and Thorbecke (1997)
examine how unexpected changes in employment affected Tre a s u ry
bond returns. They find that news of higher employment depresses bond
returns. To determine why, they examine what other assets are harmed
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by news of strong employment. They find a strong and statistically signif-
icant relationship between an asset’s exposure to inflation and monetary
policy and the amount the asset’s re t u rn falls following news of stro n g
employment. Strong employment hurts stocks and bonds because it can
cause inflation and because it can cause the Fed to tighten. For Treasury
bonds Coppock and Thorbecke find that fear of inflation explains more
of the fall in returns than concern about tighter monetary policy. Thus
bond market participants would prefer that employment not be too high
to prevent the risk of an overheating economy and inflation.
F u rther evidence that bonds would benefit from reducing inflation
comes from several studies. Mishkin (1990) and Campbell and Amner
(1993) show that long-term bond prices respond primarily to news about
f u t u re inflation and that news of higher inflation pushes bond re t u rn s
down. Thus contractionary policy that reduces inflation should produce
large capital gains to bondholders over time.
4
The Example of the Volcker Disinflation
These distributional effects of contractionary monetary policy can be
seen by studying the clearest recent example of a disinflation, the period
from 1979 to 1982, which economists call the “Volcker disinflation.” In
October 1979, with inflation exceeding 10 percent, Federal Reserv e
Figure 1  Change in the Unemployment Rate by Race over the 48 Months
Following a Monetary Contraction (up to December 1992)
Month
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chairman Paul Volcker declared his commitment to fight inflation. He
allowed the federal funds rate to increase 800 basis points. Long-term
Treasury and corporate bonds both increased by about 500 basis points.
These higher interest rates slowed the economy and contributed to two
recessions, one in 1980 and one in 1981–1982. Finally, in late 1982,
with unemployment at a postwar high of over 10 percent and inflation
below 4 percent, the Fed eased on monetary policy. How was the burden
of this disinflation shared across the economy?
Table 3 shows the percentage change in employment by sector fro m
September 1979 to the end of 1982. Other things equal, employment
should have increased over this period because the population increased
and the size of the economy grew, but the table shows that employment
in durable manufacturing was down 18 percent and employment in
construction was down 15 percent. The sector that came next in percent
decline was transportation, with a not very close 3 percent decline.
Other sectors showed a minor decrease or a minor to moderate increase.
Thus the brunt of the disinflation fell on workers in durable goods and
construction.
F i g u re 2 shows earnings of small and large firms from 1970 to 1995.
Following Fama and French (1995), firms are classified as small if the
market capitalization of their stocks is below the median value for the
New York Stock Exchange.
5 E a rnings of small and large firms are divided
Table 3 P e rcentage Change in Employment by Sector from September
1979 to the End of 1982









Finance, insurance, real estate 6.9
Services 11.0
Source: Haver Analytics data tape.
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by the book values of the firms to make the two series comparable. Until
1981 profitability showed little relationship to firm size. However, during
the 1981–1982 recession the profits of small firms declined much more
than the profits of large firms. After the recession the earnings of larg e
f i rms quickly re c o v e red, but the earnings of small firms never neared pre re-
cession levels and remained at historically low levels. Thus small firm s
w e re harmed much more by the Volcker disinflation than large firm s
Figure 3 shows unemployment by race from the middle of 1979 to the
end of 1983. Black unemployment reached a high point of 21.2 percent,
Hispanic unemployment hit 15.7 percent, and white unemployment
remained below 10 percent. From October 1979 until unemployment
peaked at the end of 1982, black unemployment increased 9.5 percent,
Hispanic unemployment increased 7.1 percent, and white unem-
ployment increased 4.5 percent. Minorities clearly paid a much higher
price than whites for the reduction in inflation that occurred.  
Bonds, on the other hand, soared as inflation went down. Inflation in
1981 was high, just short of 9 percent. In 1982, on the other hand, infla-
tion fell below 4 percent. Long-term Treasury securities provided a total
re t u rn in 1982 exceeding 40 percent. This annual re t u rn on Tre a s u ry
securities was easily the highest ever. The wealthiest 10 percent of
Source: Data to 1991, Eugene Fama and Ken French, “Size and Book-to-Market Factors in
Earnings and Returns,” Journal of Finance 50: 131–156. Data after 1991, Compustat data
tape.
Figure 2  E a rnings of Small and Large Firms Divided by Book Common Equity
Year
PPB No.38  2/18/99  2:10 PM  Page 19households held almost 95 percent of all bonds and trusts in 1982
( M o o re 1989; Niggle 1989). Thus, while lower-income individuals
suffered disproportionately from the decrease in employment, the record
return on bonds in 1982 yielded a huge windfall for the wealthy.
Policy Implications
The econometric results and the example of the Volcker disinflation
present a consistent picture of how the burden of disinflationary policy is
distributed: Employment in construction and durables decreases dispro-
p o rtionately; within these sectors income falls most for workers not
covered by union contracts; minority unemployment increases twice as
much as white unemployment; small firms’ profits decline more than
l a rge firms’ profits; and bond market investors gain. Disinflationary
policy thus redistributes wealth from low-income families to high-
income families. Would a further transfer in this direction, prod u c e d
through contractionary policy, be desirable?
To answer this question it is useful to look at how income is distributed
p resently in the United States. Bradbury (1996) shows that for the poore s t
10 percent of families real income declined almost 30 percent between
1973 and 1994, for the second poorest decile real income fell almost 20
p e rcent, and it is not until the median decile that incomes increased at all.
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Year
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The top four deciles, on the other hand, showed steady increases, with the
l a rgest increase (over 20 percent) going to the top decile. These re s u l t s
contrast with the period between 1947 and 1973, when all deciles experi-
enced steady increases in wages of about the same size. 
Given the economic difficulties facing lower-income families and the
threat to our society that increasing inequality represents, engineering a
disinflationary recession now would be inappropriate. Such a slowdown
would burden low-income families, minorities, and intere s t - s e n s i t i v e
industries while providing a bonanza to fixed-income investors, who are
primarily among the wealthy. A further redistribution to these investors
from the poor could risk tearing the fabric of our society.
While disinflationary monetary policy would be deleterious at pre s e n t ,
the danger that expansionary monetary policy will trigger inflation seems
less now than in the past. Although unemployment has fallen to about 5
p e rcent, inflation remains quiescent. In congressional testimony,
G reenspan (1997) attributes the failure of unit labor costs and thus prices
to increase as the economy expands to workers’ willingness to accept
lower wage increases in re t u rn for greater job security, partly due to their
fears of job skill obsolescence. He cites other factors moderating pre s s u re s
for wage and price increases such as international competition, the
decline of unions, the deceleration of health care costs, and dere g u l a t i o n .
In the past the Fed sometimes applied the monetary brakes when employ-
ment grew more than expected. The fact that prices of assets harmed by
c o n t r a c t i o n a ry monetary policy fell after news of strong employment gro w t h
(Coppock and Thorbecke 1997) indicates that Wall Street expected the Fed
to tighten when employment expanded quickly. Prominent Fed watcher
David Jones (1994) says that employment was Gre e n s p a n ’s favorite series to
watch and that he was more inclined to tighten monetary policy when it
g rew quickly. The problem with restricting employment to fight inflation is
that it forces low-income workers and minorities to pay the lion’s share of
the costs of controlling inflation. With these groups suffering and inflation
risks low, now is an appropriate time to let the economy grow rather than
limiting the amount employment can increase and unemployment can fall.
As Joseph Stiglitz, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers,
has said, allowing the jobless rate to remain low will particularly help
workers such as inner-city blacks and people on welfare who have diff i c u l t y
finding jobs (Washington Post 1997, D2).
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less willing to tighten when employment increased, bond market part i c i-
pants would demand a larger inflation risk premium and push up long-
t e rm rates. While this argument may have some validity, it is not
compelling for several reasons. First, by not raising short - t e rm intere s t
rates when there are signs of economic strength, the Fed could prevent a
lot of the increases in longer- t e rm rates (see Thorbecke 1996; Coppock
and Thorbecke 1997). Second, the U.S. Tre a s u ry has recently issued 
inflation-indexed bonds, giving those concerned about inflation an instru-
ment free of inflation risk. Third, if inflation did not materialize, investors
would bid interest rates back down. Fourth, the Fed should not focus
n a rrowly on the interests of the bond market but broadly on the intere s t s
of the country (see Blinder 1996). If it is determined that allowing unem-
ployment to fall is a sensible policy, the Fed should follow that policy even
if it displeases bond investors who would prefer zero inflation risk.
The combination of the facts that lower-income families are suffering in
t od a y ’s global economy and that risks of inflation are low indicates that
rather than causing the economy to contract, the Fed should let it
expand. Allowing employment to grow would dispro p o rt i o n a t e l y
benefit individuals most at risk for shrinking income and unemploy-
ment. Although “testing the waters” by letting unemployment fall
would involve some risk of price increases, the Fed would have ample
time to contain any incipient inflation before it became embedded in
wages and prices. Given that growing income disparity may endanger
our ability to go forw a rd together as a unified society, implementing
policies that promote distributive justice and social cohesion is of
p a rticular moment.
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N o t e s
1.  G re e n s p a n ’s statement was made in his Humphrey-Hawkins testimony
b e f o re Congress in July 1995. McDonough’s statement was quoted in T h e
New Yorker, October 16, 1995, p. 113.
2. Although standard errors are not always presented, the effects reported are
statistically significant. Data on industrial production, the inflation rate,
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reserves, employment by industry, and unemployment by race were obtained
from the Haver Analytics data tape. Since data on commodity prices were
available from Haver beginning in January 1967, the sample period used to
obtain the estimates in Table 1 was January 1967 to December 1995. Since
data on unemployment disaggregated into white, black, and Hispanic cate-
gories were available from Haver beginning in March 1973, the sample
p e r i od used to obtain the estimates in Figure 1 was March 1973 to
December 1995.
3.  The results are presented for white workers, but the same pattern holds for
nonwhite workers.
4. It is true that disinflationary monetary policy that raises current and
expected short - t e rm interest rates can depress bond re t u rns. However,
Thorbecke (1996) found that bond prices also decline if bond market
investors perceive that the Fed is too timid about raising interest rates to
fight inflation. Further, the evidence of Campbell and Amner (1993) and
Mishkin (1990) that bond prices are primarily driven by news of inflation
implies that the benefit to bond market participants of disinflationary
monetary policy over time outweighs the short-run costs of higher interest
rates.
5.  The data up to 1986 are taken from Fama and French (1995) and after that
f rom the Compustat data tape. To facilitate interpretation, the data for
small firms up to 1986 are the average of the two small firm series that Fama
and French used and similarly the data for large firms are the average of the
two large firm series they employed. Since earnings of small firms in both
series fell precipitously in 1981–1982 and earnings of large firms in both
series did not, taking averages in this manner should present an accurate
picture of what happened to earnings during the Volcker disinflation.  
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